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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives of rms selling vertically di¤erentiated products to merge. To
this aim, we introduce a three-stage game in which, at the rst stage, three independent rms
can decide to merge with their competitors via a sequential game of coalition formation and,
at the second and third stage, they can optimally revise their qualities and prices, respectively.
We study whether such binding agreements (i.e. full or partial mergers) can be sustained
as subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game, and analyze their e¤ects on
equilibrium qualities, prices and prots. We nd that, although protable, the merger-to-
monopoly of all rms is not an outcome of the nite-horizon negotiation, where only partial
mergers arise. Moroever, we show that all stable mergers always include the rm initially
producing the bottom quality good and reduce the number of variants on sale.
Keywords: Mergers, Price Collusion, Vertically Di¤erentiated Products, Sequential Game of
Coalition Formation.
JEL Classication: D42, D43, L1, L12, L13, L41.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the incentives of rms selling vertically di¤erentiated products to merge.
Empirical investigations show that the rms involved in mergers and acquisitions usually re-
vise their prices and qualities.1 In some cases, they may also decide to shut down part of
their product lines, thereby putting in place a market pruning of the variants on sale.2 For
instance, Steven and Waldfogel (2001) found that the series of mergers following the 1996
Telecommunications Act drastically reduced the number of stations but increased the relative
number of varieties of formats available. Sweeting (2010) and George (2007) reported similar
evidence for the U.S. radio music industry and Fan (2013) for the U.S. newspaper market.3
For airline industry, Peters (2006) observed a reduction of ight frequency on segments where
merging carriers are competing against each other, whereas Mazzeo (2003) showed that carri-
ers deteriorate their on-time performance as result of a less competitive after-merger market
structure.
These possibilities are explicitly considered by the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010)
when stating that:
Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that
adversely a¤ect customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety,
reduced service, or diminished innovation.(U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 2010).4
Anecdotal evidence shows that frequently mergers and acquisitions occur among rms sell-
ing products which are fairly di¤erentiated along the quality spectrum. For example, most of
mergers that took place after the deregulation of U.S. airline market in 1979 occurred between
one big national/international carrier and one low fare local carrier (e.g. the merger between
American Airlines and AirCal in 1986 or between Delta and Atlantic Southeast Airlines in
1999)5 or, alternatively, among intermediate-quality carriers (as for Southwest Airlines and
1See, for instance, Steven and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010) for an analysis of mergers in the radio
music industry, George (2007) and Fan (2013) for the newspapers market, Giraud-Heraud et al. (2003) for
mergers occurred in the mineral water industry, Peters (2006), Lee (2013) and Mazzeo (2003) for those in the
airline industry and Draganska et al. (2009) for those in the ice-cream market.
2A top cited case is Apple withdrawing from the market its i-phone 5 when marketing its enhanced smart-
phone i-phone 6. See also Johnson and Myatt (2003) for a detailed description of pruning by an incumbent as
e¤ect of an entrant in the market.
3 In particular, using data on the assignment of reporters to topical areas at 706 newspapers in the US, George
(2007) observes that di¤erentiation increases with ownership concentration. Sweeting (2010) nds instead that
those rms that buy competing stations tend to emphasize "service di¤erentiation" among themselves.
4For an analysis of recent US antitrust trials in which quality issues arise see, for instance, McMillan
(2015).
5A complete list of U.S. airlines industry mergers is available at: http://www.airlines.org.
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AirTran Airways in 2010).6 The European Airlines industry similarly experienced a high num-
ber of mergers among highly di¤erentiated airlines as, for instance, those between Air France
and Air-Inter in 1999 or between Lufthansa and Air Dolomiti, started in 1993 and concluded in
2003.7 In a similar way, the automotive industry is plenty of examples of premium segment car
producers absorbing economy automobile manufacturers, as in the merger between Volkswagen
Group and Skoda in 1991 or between Nissan and Renault in 1999.8 As a consequence of these
consolidation processes, often rms re-position their lower quality brand towards a higher seg-
ment of the market as well as, in some other cases, to un-brand intermediate quality products
to create a ghting brand thereby competing more aggressively with the rms positioned at the
bottom of the quality spectrum. Under this perspective, the boom of mergers recently observed
in pharmaceutical industries, involving top pharmaceutical companies acquiring generics drugs
manufacturers (as in the recent case of Teva absorbing Allergan Generics), might be seen as
an attempt of branded rms to sell generic versions of their branded products without being
objected by antitrust authorities.9 However, the latter strategy appears more as a temporary
strategy, since a ghting brand presents the high risk to cannibalize the market of the merging
rms. This could have been one of the reasons why Lufhtansa decided to sell its share of the
low-cost airlines Condor in 2006. Ultimately, a consolidated group can nd more advantageous
to re-brand its economy products rather than un-brand some of its intermediate quality outlets.
Instead of letting Smart for Two competing in the low segment of the market, Daimler-Benz
preferred to transform this city car into a premium car.
To study these issues, in this paper we introduce a simple framework in which three rms
selling three vertically di¤erentiated products contemplate merging with all or some of their
rival rms. Once merged, rms can optimally reshape their qualities and prices according to
the new market structure. Thus, taking into account all alternative price-quality equilibrium
congurations, we study whether full or partial mergers can be sustained as subgame perfect
equilibria of a coalition formation game played at the rst stage. Moreover, we analyze the
e¤ects of di¤erent coalition structures on equilibrium qualities, prices and prots accruing to
6Other mergers between medium and small airlines are also those between Republic Airways and Midwest
Airlines in 2009, Republic Airways and Frontier Airlines in 2010 and many others. Such a long series of mergers
nally turned the U.S. Airlines industry into a quadriopoly between Delta, United Airlines, Southwest and
American Airways which, together, control more than 80% of the passenger capacity.
7 In some other cases the low-cost carriers have attempted to take over small-medium companies, as in the
recent hostile takeover launched by Ryanair to Air Lingus.
8Also the purchase in 1964 by Volkswagen of Auto Union (later known as Audi) from Daimler-Benz was
mainly due, at that time,to the production of economy cars by Auto Union.
9See, for instance, Wieczner (2015), The real reasons for the pharma merger boom, Fortune, July 28, 2015.
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rms.
In the remaining of this section we briey review some of the existing literature on collusive
agreements and mergers under product di¤erentiation and detail the main content of our paper.
1.1 Related Literature
The relationship between collusive agreements and vertical product di¤erentiation was formerly
analyzed by Hackner (1994). In his work, the key question is whether price collusion is more
likely to arise when products are close substitutes or, rather, highly di¤erentiated. In a duopoly
setting, he nds that monopoly pricing is easier to sustain in markets in which products are
similar. Further, he proves that the incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement is always
stronger for the high-quality rm. The main reason is that when the quality gap between
products is signicant, the prot of the top-quality rm is already high under no collusion,
so that its incentive to collude is weak. As the quality gap decreases and the noncooperative
payo¤ become smaller for the high-quality rm, reaching a collusive agreement becomes more
and more attractive. Along the same research line, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) study how
the stability of price collusion in a duopoly setting is a¤ected by the introduction of a minimum
quality standard. They observe how the introduction of a welfare-maximizing minimum quality
standard makes collusive agreements more di¢ cult to sustain. This is because the existence
of a standard decreases product di¤erentiation by providing the bottom quality rm with a
stronger incentive to break the agreement.10
There are two common traits in these works. First, (i) the degree of product di¤erentiation
does not change after a coalition has formed, since the collusive behavior is restricted to
pricing. The former assumption is a natural entry point in the literature on cartel stability
under product di¤erentiation, as it enables to disentangle the e¤ect of quality gap on the
stability of a cartel. Further, conceiving collusion in terms of pricing is particularly reasonable
in a short-run perspective. Still, it leaves unexplored a companion question, namely the e¤ect
of the cartel on product di¤erentiation. This analysis is particularly pregnant in a long-run
perspective since one cannot exclude that in a more extended time span a coalition (typically
a cartel or a merger) entails structural changes, such as relocations of production facilities, or
adjustment in the product range and quality.
Secondly, (ii) the market is populated by two rms so that it turns out to be fully mo-
10 In Hackner, the opposite holds since, due to the cost structure, in his model the asymmetry in prots gives
an advantage to the high quality rm.
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nopolized by a grand coalition in the case of cooperation between rms.11 While considering
at the start a duopoly enables to detail the e¤ects of a full cooperation, casual observations
show that, there exist circumstances under which rms choose to form a partial merger (i.e.
one including a subset of rms in the market) rather than the grand coalition. In any partial
merger, colluding rms compete against some rivals outside the coalition so that a noncoop-
erative behavior is still preserved. Thus, the e¤ects of a partial merger are not equivalent to
those observed when all agents merge and mimic a monopolist.
The aim of our analysis is to consider the incentive of rms to merge when the degree of
di¤erentiation may change once a coalition has formed and the market is populated by more
than two rms. Accordingly, we assume that the market is initially populated by three rms,
each of them producing a variant which is di¤erentiated along a quality ladder.
As far as we know, the only model of vertical di¤erentiation with three independent rms
competing in quality and price is provided by Scarpa (1998).12 Considering the role of a
minimum quality standard, Scarpa (1998) highlights how the demand level of a rm in a
vertically di¤erentiated market depends on quality and price of adjacent rms in the product
space. This property, reminiscent of a spatial competition approach, is rather interesting when
considering the rationale adopted by the colluding rms to dene the optimal range of variants.
Indeed, since only adjacent variants compete against each other, under partial collusion dening
the optimal set of products to market requires to put in balance the cannibalization e¤ect that
a variant produced by the coalition may exert within the coalition with the possibility that
this variant steals consumers from the rival rm (henceforth stealing e¤ect).13 We nest in this
formal setting the possibility that rms merge thereby generating either a grand coalition or
a partial merger. Then, the merged entity optimally chooses price and quality against the
competitor, if any. Considering that rms in the post-merger scenario can choose price and
quality relates our paper to Lambertini (2000). He studies how cartel stability is related to
R&D activity in a duopoly with convex costs, and assumes that a collusive quality choice
can either occur under price or quantity-setting behaviour.14 The issue concerning merger
11The grand coalition is the one formed by all rms in the market.
12Pezzino (2010) analyses quantity competition among three rms in a vertically di¤erentiated market.
13These e¤ects resembles the so called peer e¤ect and pecking order e¤ect. The peer e¤ect takes place when
joining organization with high-quality agents increases the payo¤ of its members. This e¤ects explains why
outstanding researchers tend to join top research department. On the other hand, the pecking order e¤ect takes
place when the payo¤ an individual gets depends on his/her relative position in a ranking. Typically, people at
the top in the pecking order have a greater chance to obtain further internal promotions.
14A di¤erent strand of literature considers the possible impacts of R&D joint ventures on product market
collusion. See on this, Martin (1995) and Lambertini et al. (2002).
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formation with more than two rms in a vertically di¤erentiated market is, however, unexplored
in Lambertini (2000), like so the impact of partial collusion on market equilibrium. The
introduction of an intermediate quality rm sheds light on some interesting features of the
coalition formation process.
Finally, it can be useful to briey mention here other related strands of literature dealing
with mergers in markets in which products are not vertically di¤erentiated. In particular, our
paper is close in the spirit to Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) and, within the literature on
horizontally di¤erentiated products, to Gandhi et al. (2008) and Brekke et al. (2014). Indeed,
although all these authors do not consider quality as the main source of product di¤erentiation,
their analysis centers around the price-quality post-merger re-positioning which is our main
aim.15 The rst paper is inspired by Salant et al. (1983) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
and it is devoted to evaluate the protability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition in a symmetric model of product di¤erentiation. The authors assume that the
market is initially populated by three rms and, therefore, two rms can merge and decide
on the number of brands to market. When the xed cost of marketing a brand is high, the
merged entity reduces its product range. This increases the protability of mergers both under
Bertrand and Cournot competition due to reduced marketing costs. With a lowcost of mar-
keting, the e¤ect on the product range depends both on the nature of competition and on the
degree of product di¤erentiation. For example, under Cournot or Bertrand competition and
su¢ ciently di¤erentiated products, the non-merging rm nds protable to introduce a new
brand, thereby damaging the merged entity. In Gandhi et al. (2008), rms are assumed able
to instantaneously and costlessly reposition their products after a merger, thereby choosing
both price and location in a Hotelling market. They show that after a merger the products are
repositioned away from each other to reduce the resulting cannibalization e¤ect. Consequently,
non-merging substitutes are repositioned between the merged products and, after all these lo-
cation strategies, the merged rms incentive to raise prices decreases. In a spatial competition
model à la Salop with three ex ante identical rms, Brekke et al. (2014) show that any two-
rm merger reduces its product quality whereas the non-merging rm responds increasing its
quality. Final prices can either increase or decrease according to the responsiveness of demand
functions. Moreover, it is shown that if a merger entails the closure of one of the two merged
rms, it always leads to higher qualities and prices for all rms in the market.16
15Other recent papers by Mazzeo (2002), Einav (2003) and Seim (2006) focus on the price-quality strategies
decided by industry entrants. These models are particularly relevant for the analysis of the strategic behaviour
of ex ante symmetric rms deciding their price-quality positioning (see on this, the discussion of Section 3).
16While these works represent important advancements in considering the relationship between merger and
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However, as also the literature above highlights, the mechanics of mergers in markets with
horizontally di¤erentiated products is quite di¤erent from that in markets with vertically di¤er-
entiated products. As observed in Norman et al. (2005), "eliminating product lines is unlikely
to be an issue in markets with undi¤erentiated products or in markets in which the products
are best thought as horizontally di¤erentiated. [...]. (p.1205). In these markets, "rms have an
incentive to maintain their pre-merger product lines as a means to reach as many consumers as
possible" (ibidem, p.1205). Of course, the cannibalization e¤ect still plays a role in an Hotelling
setting and, thus, can weaken the incentive to keep on sale di¤erentiated varieties. Nonetheless,
whenever rms produce horizontally di¤erentiated goods, the equilibrium conguration is also
(and strongly) determined by transport costs. When transport costs are extremely high, rms
behave like local monopolists and the cannibalization is weak. In contrast, as transport costs
tends to zero, the market with horizontally di¤erentiated goods tends to mimic market with
homogeneous products where rms do not have market power. In this alternative case, the
cannibalization e¤ect is likely to be more signicant than the incentive to satisfy heterogeneous
preferences so that rms can decide to remove some goods from the market in the post-merger
scenario.17
1.2 Our Paper
In the present paper we consider a setting in which three rms initially produce three vertically
di¤erentiated products as independent rms. In this environment, we study their incentives
to sign full or partial binding agreement among rms, knowing in advance that the resulting
mergers will be able to manipulate collusively their quality-price combinations.
More specically, we introduce a three-stage game where, at the rst stage, every rm
expresses its willingness to merge with its competitors or, alternatively, to remain independent.
A merger can either contains all rms in the market (grand coalition) or a subset of them (two
rms colluding against the third one playing alone). As in Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and
Vohra (1999) we assume that the coalition formation game is sequential, with an exogenous
order of play. Di¤erently from them, we assume that every rm proposes not only an alliance,
but also a division of the coalition joint payo¤.18 Each recipient of the proposal can either
competition, they are concerned with ingredients, such as transport costs, which do not matter when goods are
di¤erentiated in quality. Still, they identify strategic motives for withdrawing products which shall be relevant
in our analysis. We discuss this point in the next section.
17See also Gandhi et al. (2008) for an analysis of the e¤ect of transport cost on the rms choice to prune
goods.
18Bloch (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) assume identical players and a xed allocation rule within
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accept or reject the o¤er and, in case of rejection, it becomes its turn to make a proposal.
The game is assumed nite-horizon and every rm only possesses one turn of proposal in each
period.19 Once a coalition structure has formed, at the second stage rms decide simultaneously
the optimal quality of their products. When considering this issue, we take into account how
a full or partial merger among rms may a¤ect their incentives to di¤erentiate products in
the market. Choosing the optimal quality after colluding a¤ects, in turn, their incentives
to merge. Finally, at the third and nal stage, rms set simultaneously prices. When in a
coalition, quality and price are set so as to maximize the joint prot of rms which belong to
it. Notice also that, when merging, rms can choose at the second stage (resp. third stage) to
produce a quality so low (resp. to quote a price so high) that no consumer is willing to buy it.
This is equivalent to stop producing the variant, thereby reducing the range of products sold
at equilibrium.
We nd that, although the full monopoly merger would arise in an innite-horizon sequen-
tial game of coalition formation, under a nite horizon the incentive for rms to enter the full
market merger is always dominated by that to form partial coalition structures (partial merg-
ers). Furthermore, we prove that all equilibrium mergers always contain the bottom quality
rm which, in all cases, drops its low-quality variant from the market. In particular, whoever
is the additional player included in coalition (either the intermediate or the top quality rm),
equilibrium prices and qualities always coincide with that observed in the case of a duopoly,
with a high-quality rm competing against a low-quality rival, as in Motta (1992). At rst
sight, this result seems to be counterintuitive. A natural conjecture when considering that
players producing di¤erent variants merge is that either the range of variants or the quality
gap between variants in the market changes with the players involved in the merger. We
nd on the contrary that only prots accruing to the single players change with the type of
partial merger, range of products, quality gap and price being unchanged. Indeed, the canni-
balization e¤ect and the stealing e¤ect induce the merger, whatever its members, to withdraw
from the market the lowest quality variant between the set which can be produced a priori.
Interestingly, depending on the intensity of these e¤ects, in some circumstances this variant
is withdrawn from the market at the price stage, in some other circumstances at the quality
stage. In particular, the merger formed by the intermediate quality and by the low-quality
each coalition. See also Belleamme (2000) for an extension of the model to the formation of asymmetric
alliances, and also Bloch (2002, 2003), Marini (2009) and Currarini and Marini (2015) for extensive surveys on
alliance formation models applied to oligopoly.
19Both Blochs (1995, 1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) models are, instead, innite-horizon. Our assump-
tions are meant to describe an environment in which the time of negotiation is quite limited in each period.
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rm stops immediately to market the bottom-quality product at the price stage. In contrast,
the merger formed by the top and the bottom-quality rm keeps the bottom product (as a
ghting brand) at the price stage whereas ultimately drops it at the quality stage. As argued
above, keeping a ghting brand in an alliance is mostly a short-run (price) than a medium/long
run strategy (quality) and it is, therefore, dropped when the merging group can re-position its
product lines.
Finally, we nd that, in all equilibrium partial mergers, the bottom-quality rm is always
present. This appears in line with numerous theoretical and experimental studies on coalition
formation in triads of heterogeneous individuals possessing di¤erent skills or ghting ability
(e.g. Caplow 1956, 1959, 1968, Vinacke and Arko¤ 1957, Gamson 1961). A central conclusion
of these studies is that weakness is strength (see, for instance, Mesterton-Gibbons et al.
2011, p.189), with this meaning that less-powered individuals have usually more chances to
be part of a coalition. We obtain the same result with the rms competing in a vertically
di¤erentiated market. Here the main reason to merge with a lower quality rm is to soften
competition.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the market and the
various equilibrium market congurations, the noncooperative case,20 the full merger case and
all di¤erent cases of partial mergers. Section 3 introduces the coalition formation game and
characterizes the mergers which are stable. Section 5 briey concludes. Most of the proofs are
gathered in the Appendix.
2 The Market
As mentioned in the introduction, rms are assumed to play a three-stage game: (i) a coalition
formation game (stage 1) assumed sequential; (ii) a market game including a quality stage
(stage 2) and a price stage (stage 3) both played simultaneously by the rms. Since the
game is solved backward, we start below with the description of the market game and, after
solving for the equilibria of the second and third stage of the game, we introduce the coalition
formation game and all results obtained therein.
For the market, to keep things simple we adopt the well known specication of Mussa and
Rosens (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisses (1979) models of a vertically di¤erentiated market.
In particular, we assume an uncovered market initially populated by three rms, i = H;M;L
20Part of this analysis is also contained in Scarpa (1998).
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selling three vertically di¤erentiated goods, denoted vH ; vM ; vL with vH > vM > vL.21 Also, for
every i, vi 2 [0; v], where v 2 R+ is the highest quality level which is technologically feasible.22
There exists a quality specic xed cost, say ci = 12v
2
i . Notice that this cost does not depend
on quantity, while being strictly increasing and convex in quality. On the one hand, the most
appropriate way to model the cost function may depend on the features of the industry in
which rms compete. Whenever a rm mainly faces a quality development cost (namely when
the cost depends on a technology enabling it to produce a specic quality), then assuming that
costs do not depend on quantity could be a reasonable assumption. Most importantly though,
it can be shown that the inclusion of quality dependent production costs would not alter the
qualitative results of the model as long as rmsmarginal and unitary production cost are
either constant or increase less than proportionally with quality. For instance, it is easy to
prove that, for this range of cost functions functions and for any number of rms, the merger
involving all rms in the market would put on sale only the top quality product among those
previously put on sale by the competing rms.23 Therefore, to simplify calculations, in what
follows we will assume zero variable production costs.
Let consumers be indexed by , which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0; 1], with
density function denoted f ().24 The parameter  captures consumerswillingness to pay
(henceforth WTP) for quality: the higher , the higher the corresponding WTP. Each consumer
can either buy one variant or not buying at all. Formally, consumersutility can be written as
U() =
(
vi   pi if she/he buys variant i
0 if she/he refrains from buying.
where pi is the price charged by a rm for variant i. From the above formulation, the
consumer indi¤erent between buying variant i and not buying is:
L =
pL
vL
;
while the consumer M indi¤erent between buying variant L and M (resp. M and H) is:25
21Since for our model specication the market is always endogenously uncovered in the case of a monopolist,
the assumption of uncovered market, namely that some of the consumers refrain from buying goods, appears in
our model as the most natural one.
22We share this assumption on the quality interval with Wauthy (1996).
23See on this, also Gabszewicz et al. (1986).
24Considering an interval [0;m] would simply lead to the addition of a parameter on which prices, quantities
and quality levels would depend linearly, with no substantial changes in the payo¤ structure (see, for istance,
Scarpa 1998).
25We easily deduce the expression of the indi¤erent consumer from: UL() = UM () and UM () = UL()
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M =
pM   pL
vM   vL (resp. H =
pH   pM
vH   vM ):
Of course, since qualities are endogenously dened at stage 1, the demand function for
rms when producing vH , vM ; and vL can be written, respectively, as:
DH =
1Z
H
f()d = (1  H) ;
DM =
HZ
M
f()d = (H   M ) ;
DL =
MZ
L
f()d = (M   L) ;
and, the corresponding prot functions are:
H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH   1
2
v2H (1)
M =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM   1
2
v2M (2)
L =

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL   1
2
v2L: (3)
2.1 Equilibrium Analysis: Prices and Qualities
Since the whole game is solved backward, we can start characterizing the two nal stages of
the game. In particular, we rstly present the benchmark case of the analysis, that is the case
in which all rms decide noncooperatively prices and qualities (noncooperative equilibrium);
secondly, we turn to the case in which the grand coalition of rms has formed and they can
jointly decide prices and qualities (full collusion); nally, we look at what happens when rms
form intermediate coalitions (partial mergers). Since prices are usually more easily adjusted
than qualities, it is reasonable to assume that rms dene qualities at the second stage (quality
stage) and set prices at the third one (price stage).
The game is solved by backward induction. So, we consider rst the price stage under the
assumption that qualities have been xed. Then, we move to the quality stage.
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2.1.1 Noncooperative equilibrium
In this section, we briey summarize price and quantity equilibrium obtained when the three
rms compete in the market against each other, while referring the interesting reader to Scarpa
(1998) for further details. We assume that at the rst stage, no collusive agreement has been
reached so that rms decide their quality and then their price in a fully noncooperative fashion.
Price stage At the price stage, given that costs are xed, we can study the noncooperative
price behaviour of the three rms by simply characterizing their revenue functions in the quality
spectrum: (i) top quality H, (ii) intermediate quality M and (iii) bottom quality L.
Thus di¤erentiating (1), (2) and (3) w.r.t pH , pM and pL, respectively, we can easily derive
all rmsbest-replies as:26
pH(pM ) =
1
2
pM +
1
2
(vH   vM ) ; (4)
pM (pH ; pL) =
1
2
pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM )
vH   vL (5)
and
pL(pM ) =
1
2
pM
vL
vM
: (6)
As stressed by Scarpa (1998), the best-reply function of a rm depends on the quality and
price of the rm itself and of its neighboring rivals, while products that are farther away in the
product space do not play any role. From the above, equilibrium prices pi at the price stage
are obtained as:
pH(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (4vMvH   vLvH   3vLvM ) 
4vMvH   vLvH   2vLvM   v2M
 (7)
pM (vH ; vM ; vL) =
1 (vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vM 
4vMvH   vLvH   2vLvM   v2M
 (8)
pL(vH ; vM ; vL) =
1
2
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) vL 
4vHvM   vHvL   2vLvM   v2M
 ; (9)
with corresponding prots
H(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
(vH   vM ) (vHvL   4vHvM + 3vLvM )2 
v2M + vLvH   4vMvH + 2vLvM
2   12v2H (10)
26Firmsprot functions (1)-(3) are strictly concave in their respective prices.
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M (p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) = v2M
(vH   vM ) (vM   vL) (vH   vL) 
v2M + vLvH   4vMvH + 2vLvM
2   12v2M (11)
L(p
(vH ; vM ; vL)) =
1
4
vL (vH   vM )2 (vM   vL) vM 
v2M + vLvH   vM4vH + 2vLvM
2   12v2L; (12)
where p = (pH ; p

M ; p

L) denote the Nash equilibrium prices of rms obtained at the price
stage (stage 3). Let us now consider the choice of qualities by rms.
Quality stage In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium quality choices occurring at
the second stage, it su¢ ces to maximize payo¤ function (10), (11) and (12) w.r.t. quality
vH ; vM ; vL, respectively, thereby getting:27
vH = 0:2526; v

M = 0:0497; v

L = 0:0095: (13)
Moreover, the corresponding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices p(v) and protsi(p(v)),
for v = (vH ; v

M ; v

L), are immediately obtained as:
pH(v
) = 0:10601; pM (v
) = 0:00912; pL(v
) = 0:0008; (14)
and
H (p
(v)) = 0:02348; M (p(v)) = 0:00124; L (p(v)) = 0:00005: (15)
2.1.2 Mergers
By denition a merger can either involve the set of all rms, denoted N = fH;M;Lg (grand
coalition) or, alternatively, any other nonempty subset S  N of them, with S 2 N , where
N = 2Nn? is the set of all nonempty coalitions of the N rms, in this case simply:
N = (fHg ; fMg ; fLg ; fH;Mg ; fH;Lg ; fM;Lg ; fH;M;Lg) :
Thus, while if the rms form the grand coalition they commit irrevocably to jointly set qualities
and prices so as to maximize the sum of all rmsprots (full merger), in the second scenario
(partial merger), a smaller subset of rms jointly decide qualities and prices, again irrevocably,
so as to maximize the sum of their own prots, while competing against a rival(s), if any. In
27 It can be easily checked that all rm second-stage prot functions are strictly concave in their own qualities.
In what follows,for ease of exposition, we truncate our numerical results to ve decimals.
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general, we can describe any type of (full or partial) collusive or noncooperative behaviour by
simply indicating the coalition structure C = (S1; S2; :::; Sm) representing a collection of rms
in coalition having null intersection and summing up to N , with m  n. The set C of all
coalition structures C that can be formed by the three rms is, therefore, simply given by:
C = ((fHg ; fMg ; fLg) ; (fH;Mg ; fLg) ; (fHg ; fM;Lg) ; (fH;Lg ; fMg) ; (fH;M;Lg)) :
The game is solved backward so that we rst analyze the price and then the quality stage
under the assumption that either the grand coalition or any other intermediate coalition struc-
ture have formed at the rst stage. After the full characterization of market equilibrium in
any of these cases, we wonder which type of merger (if any) can prevail in equilibrium.
2.1.3 Full Merger
Let us assume that, at the rst stage, rms have formed the grand coalition. In the following,
we consider the price and then the quality decision.
Price stage When the grand coalition fNg forms, at the price stage each rm maximizes the
sum of all rmspayo¤s (1)-(3) for arbitrary levels of the quality chosen at the second stage.
Thus, by the price maximization of the joint payo¤ of the grand coalition, rmsoptimal replies
pcL; p
c
M and p
c
H are obtained as
pcH(pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM ); (16)
pcM (pH ; pL) =
pH(vM   vL) + pL (vH   vM )
vH   vL ; (17)
and
pcL(pM ) = pM
vL
vM
: (18)
By solving the system (16)-(18), the optimal price prole pfNg(v), for v = (vH ; vM ; vL), is:
p
fNg
H (vH) =
1
2vH ; p
fNg
M (vM ) =
1
2vM ; p
fNg
L (vL) =
1
2vL: (19)
Hence, in this case the rmsmarket shares at the price stage are:
DH
 
pfNg(v)

= 12 ; DM
 
pfNg(v)

= 0; DL
 
pfNg(v)

= 0: (20)
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It is immediate to see that, for the prices selected by the grand coalition, consumers are
willing to buy only the top quality variant vH , the demand for the intermediate and bottom
variants being nil. Accordingly, the prot accruing to the grand coalition at the price stage is
fNg(pfNg (v)) =
1
4
vH   1
2
v2H :
Quality stage In order to fully characterize the behaviour of the grand coalition, we can
easily nd its optimal quality, given by vfNgH = 0:25 and its nal prot is simply given by:
fNg

pfNg(vfNg)

= 0:03125: (21)
The logic underlying this nding has been well described by Mussa and Rosen (1978):
Serving customers who place smaller valuations on quality creates negative externalities for
the monopolist that limit possibilities for capturing consumer surplus from those who do value
quality highly(p.306).28 Rather interestingly, this nding does not depend on the initial
assumption on market coverage. Indeed, even if one would develop the above analysis under
the alternative assumption that the market is covered, still at the price-quality equilibrium the
grand coalition would o¤er only the top-quality, while serving half of the market.
Finally, it is worth remarking that, under a full collusive behaviour, the level of prices is,
for all rms, always higher than under Nash equilibrium. This can be easily checked by the
following simple reasoning: (i) Start with the Nash equilibrium price of rm H and let the
remaining rms respond using their optimal collusive replies (16)-(17). (ii) Since comparing
(4)-(5) with (16)-(17) it turns out that optimal collusive replies are twice as sloped as the
noncooperative best-replies and both upward sloping, as e¤ect of (i) all Nn fHg rms will
increase their prices. (iii) Let now also rm H respond collusively using its optimal reply (18)
and, as a result, it will increase its price. (iv) By continuing the adjustment process of all
rms along their collusive optimal replies, since these are all contraction mappings (due to the
inequality vH > vM > vL), a new price prole pfNg will be reached with the property that
28Further discussion on this result are provided by Gabszewicz et al. (1982) and by Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2002) under the assumption of zero quality costs. Along the same research line, Accharya (1998) shows that
when the cost for quality improvement is not too convex, a multiproduct monopolist o¤ers only the top variant
among the ones which a priori can be sold in the market. Indeed, if the costs are not so signicant, o¤ering
the top variant only allows rms to escape from the cannibalization e¤ect which would take place if the more
than one variant would be saled at equilirium. Finally, Lambertini (1997) analyses the Mussa-Rosens model
with quality specic variable costs under the alternative assumptions of both full market and partial market
coverage.
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pfNg  p, where p is the corresponding prole of noncooperative Nash equilibrium prices.29
2.1.4 Partial Mergers
In this section we analyze all market congurations arising when partial mergers take place
among rms. We characterize three di¤erent market scenarios occurring, in turn, under the
following coalition structures: (i) CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), (ii) CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) and
(iii) CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg).
Before computing in detail prices and qualities of rms under partial mergers, note that
from (1)-(3) when either the bottom quality rm or the top quality rm collude in prices
with their direct competitor, i.e. the intermediate quality rm, they just behave as in the
fully collusive case, with optimal replies given by (16) and (18), respectively. On the other
hand, when bottom and top quality rms form a coalition, due to the structure of the vertical
di¤erentiation model, they set prices exactly as in the noncooperative case, with optimal
replies given by (4) and (6). Thus, under a partial merger only the price behaviour of the rm
producing the intermediate quality variant vM (henceforth denoted intermediate rm) varies
according on whether it is allied either with its left (lower quality) or with its right (higher
quality) competitor. In particular, when the intermediate rm coordinates its price with its
left competitor, its rst-order condition implies
@M
@pM
+
@L
@pM
=
2pL   2pM
vM   vL +
pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0;
whereas, when it coordinate its price with its right-competitor, it sets pM such that
@M
@pM
+
@H
@pM
=
pL   2pM
vM   vL +
2pH   2pM
vH   vM = 0:
As a result, the optimal reply of the intermediate rm, plcM (pL; pH) in the left-partial (resp.
prcM (pL; pH) in the right-partial) merger writes as
plcM (pL; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) (22)
(resp. prcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL) ). (23)
29For an extension of this result with any number of rms, see Gabszewicz et al. (2017).
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2.1.5 Partial merger between the intermediate and the bottom quality rm
We consider initially the scenario where at the rst stage a merger has occurred between rm
M and rm L, with rm H playing as singleton against them. We assume, as a start, that
variants vM and vL are produced by the colluding rms M and L, respectively. Firm H,
outside the merger, produces the high quality variant vH . We need to check whether this
quality assignment remains optimal at the equilibrium.
Price stage As coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) forms, prices pH ; pM and pL
set by rms 1, 2 and 3 at the price stage can be obtained through the maximization of the
following objective functions
H =

1  pH   pM
vH   vM

pH
M +L =

pH   pM
vH   vM  
pM   pL
vM   vL

pM +

pM   pL
vM   vL  
pL
vL

pL:
Using (4), (18), and (22), the following optimal replies are obtained, respectively as,
ppcH (pM ) =
1
2
(pM + (vH   vM ))
ppcM (pH ; pH) =
pL(vH   vM ) + 12pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
vL
vM
pM :
Therefore, the following equilibrium prices are set by rms:
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H (v) =
2vH (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M (v) =
vM (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
L (v) =
vL (vH   vM )
4vH   vM ;
with corresponding prots:
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H(p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) = 4
v2H (vH   vM )
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2H ;
M (p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) =
vH (vH   vM ) vM
(4vH   vM )2
  1
2
v2M ;
L(p
(fHg;fM;Lg)(v)) = 0:
Note that in this case the price of the low quality variant is set so high that no consumer is
willing to buy this variant and, therefore, DfM;LgL = 0. Thus, rm L ceases to be active in
the market: selling the bottom-quality variant would determine a cannibalization e¤ect within
the coalition since variant vL would be in competition only with the adjacent product vM .
Of course, it still plays a role in the coalition as the decision to stop producing benets the
coalition as a whole.30
Quality stage Then, moving to the quality stage and using the best reply functions, it is
immediate to see that top variant and intermediate variant are set, respectively, equal to
v
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M = 0:04823: (24)
Given the above, we can easily nd the equilibrium prices as
p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:10766; p
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M = 0:01025; (25)
and the corresponding equilibrium prots:

(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:02443; 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fM;Lg = 0:00152: (26)
It is easy to see that, at equilibrium, rm H continues to produce the top quality while
coalition fM;Lg sells the intermediate quality only. Note also that the above ndings coincide
with those emerging, for instance, in Motta (1992) where only two rms compete in a traditional
duopoly setting. Indeed, coalition fM;Lg behaves like a multiproduct rm: since it withdraws
from the market one of its variant, it is as if only two single-product rms would be active in
the market, each of them setting noncooperatively their quality and price. We resume these
results in the next proposition.
30 Its role will be claried at the coalition formation stage.
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Proposition 1 When the intermediate and bottom quality rm merge against the top quality
rm (playing as singleton), namely under coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), at the
price stage colluding rms set a price so high for the low quality variant that no consumer is
willing to buy it. Thus, at the price-stage only two variants are marketed and the equilibrium
conguration in terms of quality and price coincides with that occurring in a traditional duopoly
setting.
Proof. It directly follows by expressions (24), (25) and by their comparison with the results
obtained, for instance, in Motta (1992).
Finally, it is worth remarking that this merger benets both the merging rms and the
rival H which plays as a singleton. Indeed, not only the lowest quality variant is dropped out
from the market, but also the gap between variants in the market is now larger than the one
emerging in the noncooperative setting with three independent rms: under partial collusion,
the optimal quality of the intermediate variant is lower (and the top quality higher) than
the corresponding levels set noncooperatively. This relaxes price competition between rms,
thereby increasing the resulting prots.
2.1.6 Partial merger between the top and the bottom quality rm
Let us move now to the case in which at the rst stage rms H and L have merged, whereas
rm M plays as singleton. As usual, we have to verify whether this quality assignment holds
at the equilibrium.
Price stage To obtain the optimal prices decided by the merging rms H and L and by rm
M alone, we need to take into account the fact that colluding rms H and L maximize the sum
of their prots H+L, whileM is only concerned with its own prot function M . However,
since rm H and L are not direct price competitor and are separated by rm M , at the price
stage their equilibrium prices and prots coincides with those obtained in the noncooperative
case (cfr. Section 2.1.1).
Quality stage We can now move to the quality stage. In order to identify the optimal
qualities, notice that the revenue of coalition fH;Lg is monotonically decreasing in vL, as
@


(fH;Lg;fMg)
H +
(fH;Lg;fMg)
L

@vL
=
1
4
v2M
(vH   vM )2
 
v2M + vHvL + 20vMvH   22vMvL
 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vMvL
3 < 0:
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Accordingly, at the quality stage for colluding rms H and L it is protable to set vL = 0,
whatever the quality chosen by the intermediate rival M: The economic intuition underlying
this nding is that the low quality variant and the intermediate variant are strategic comple-
ments. So, if the merging rm increases vL; the independent rm producing vM would increase
its quality variant, thereby making tighter the competition with the top quality producer.31
Since the prot loss su¤ered by rm L when decreasing its quality level is lower than the gain
obtained by rm H (since the competition between vM and vH relaxes), the merging rms will
optimally set vL = 0 restricting their production only to the high quality variant vH .
As a result, from the rst-order conditions obtained maximizing, in turn, the prot of
coalition fH;Lg w.r.t to vH and the prot of rival M w.r.t vM , namely
@ (H +L)
@vH
=
 
vHv
3
M   64v4H + 48v3HvM + 16v3H   12v2Hv2M + 8vHv2M   12v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
@M
@vM
=
 
v4M   12vHv3M   64v3HvM + 4v3H + 48v2Hv2M   7v2HvM

(4vH   vM )3
= 0
given that, at equilibrium v(fH;Lg;fMg)L = 0, we obtain the following equilibrium qualities, prices
and prots under CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg):
v
(fH;Lg;fMg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:04823; (27)
p
(fH;Lg;fMg)
H = 0:10766; p
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:01025; (28)
and

(fH;Lg;fMg)
fH;Lg = 0:02443; 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:00152: (29)
Proposition 2 When the top and the bottom quality rm merge whereas the intermediate rm
remains singleton, namely under coalition structure CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg), at the quality
stage the low quality variant is set equal to zero. Prices and qualities o¤ered in equilibrium
coincide with those observed under CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg).
Proof. It directly follows by the above calculations and by comparing expressions (24)
and (25) with (27) and (28).
31See also Scarpa (1998), p. 669 for the same e¤ect in a three-rm noncooperative setting.
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It is worth noting that from a market structure viewpoint, the formation of coalition struc-
tures CH;ML and CHL;M are equivalent, as both of them entail a duopoly structure with the
same quality gap between variants. Still, the rationale underlying the equilibrium congura-
tion in coalition CH;ML cannot be extended to CHL;M . In the former case, namely when the
intermediate and bottom quality rm compete against the top quality one, the colluding rms
decide to set a price so high for the bottom variant that no consumer is willing to buy it,
whatever its quality. So, this nding would be observed even if rms would unable to dene
endogenously the quality of their products. This is the case, for instance, in a collusive agree-
ment between an intermediate and a bottom quality producer, where rms have no reason
to maintain a ghting brand. Variant vL is adjacent only to variant vM and, if kept in the
market, would reap consumers only to the other colluding player without playing any role in
the competition against the top quality rm. Rather, in the latter scenario top and bottom
quality rms can decide to reduce the bottom quality to such an extent that the corresponding
market share for this variant turns out to be nil. When the coalition decides to withdraw vari-
ant vL from the market, it takes into account two di¤erent e¤ects. On one hand, since the low
quality variant is adjacent to the intermediate variant, ceteris paribus, increasing its quality
can enable the coalition to gain market share from the competitor producing variant vM and,
thus, to benet from the higher prots obtained by the bottom quality rm. On other hand,
as these two variants vM and vL are strategic complements, the higher quality of the bottom
quality variant boosts the quality of the intermediate variant. The latter variant is, in turn,
in direct competition with the top variant: since the lower the quality gap, the ercer price
competition between players, the higher the intermediate quality, the lower, ceteris paribus,
will be the prot accruing to the top quality rm. Since the loss for this player when the low
quality is produced is higher than the gain obtained by the bottom producer, coalition fH;Lg
will prefer to stop producing this variant.
2.1.7 Partial merger between the top and the intermediate quality rm
We nally characterize the equilibrium conguration when the top and the intermediate quality
rm decide to merge, with the bottom quality rival playing as singleton.
Price stage At the price stage, rms top and intermediate quality rms maximize the sum of
their own prots, namely H +M , whereas the bottom quality rm is playing independently.
Using (6), (16) and (23), the optimal replies under coalition structure CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg)
are obtained, respectively, as
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ppcH (pM ) = pM +
1
2
(vH   vM )
ppcM (pL; pH) =
1
2pL(vH   vM ) + pH(vM   vL)
(vH   vL)
ppcL (pM ) =
1
2
vL
vM
pM .
Thus, the last stage equilibrium prices can be easily found as:
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
H (vH ; vM ; vL) =
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
2 (4vM   vL) ;
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
M (vH ; vM ; vL) =
2vM (vM   vL)
4vM   vL ;
p
((fH;Mg;fLg))
L (vH ; vM ; vL) =
vL (vM   vL)
4vM   vL ;
with corresponding prots,

((fH;Mg;fLg))
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H ;

((fH;Mg;fLg))
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M ;

((fH;Mg;fLg))
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L.
Quality stage We saw above that, at the price stage, when the coalition structure CHM;L =
(fH;Mg ; fLg) forms, no variant is withdrawn from the market. Still, at the quality stage, it
can be proved that a case of quality reversal occurs. This is done in the next proposition.
Lemma 1 In order to escape from the cannibalization taking place between adjacent variants,
merging top and intermediate quality rms enhance maximal di¤erentiation between their prod-
ucts by putting one of their variants at the bottom of the quality ladder. As a result, the rival
L "leapfrogs" this variant thereby selling a product which lies now in the middle of the quality
ladder.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that now, prot ((fH;Mg;fLg))L coincides with that obtained by rmM when produc-
ing variant vM in coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), namely ((fHg;fM;Lg))M . Thus,
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the variant produced by the merging rms coincide now with those produced under coalition
structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) where intermediate and bottom quality rms were collud-
ing. Moreover, in CHM;L = ((fH;Mg ; fLg)) the independent rm produces now the variant
that in the the previous scenarios was sold by the intermediate quality rm. In line with the
analysis performed in the previous case, the optimal variants are immediately obtained here
as:
v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
H = 0:25331; v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
M = 0 v
(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:04823; (30)
while the equilibrium prots write as:

(fH;Mg;fLg)
fH;Mg = 0:02443;

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:00152:
(31)
Thus, one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When the top and intermediate quality rms merge whereas the bottom quality
rm remains as singleton, namely under coalition structure CHM;L = ((fH;Mg ; fLg)), at the
quality stage one of the merged rms leapfrogs the adjacent rival whose variant is no longer on
sale in the market. The obtained qualities coincide with those occurring under the alternative
coalition structures CH;ML = ((fHg ; fM;Lg)) and CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg).
Proof. This follows directly by Proposition 1 and by the comparison of (27), (24) and
(30).
For ease of exposition, we summarize in the following table the payo¤s accruing to each
rm or coalition in each feasible coalition structure.
(fHg ; fMg ; fLg) H = 0:02348 M = 0:00124 L = 0:00005
fNg fNg(fH;M;Lg) = 0:03125
(fHg ; fM;Lg) (fHg;fM;Lg)H = 0:02443 (fHg;fM;Lg)fM;Lg = 0:00152
(fH;Lg ; fMg) (fH;Lg;fMg)fH;Lg = 0:02443 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
M = 0:00152
(fH;Mg ; fLg) (fH;Mg;fLg)fH;Mg = 0:02443 
(fH;Mg;fLg)
L = 0:00152
Table 1 - Firm payo¤s in every coalition structure.
It is worth remarking that the market structure (duopoly) arising in all partial mergers
does not vary with the coalition structure induced by the rms. Still, the prots accruing to
rms depend on the coalitions to (against) which they belong (compete).
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3 Equilibrium Analysis: Stable Mergers
In this section we rst consider the problem of coalition formation between three rms from a
cooperative perspective, in order to see whether and when there are advantages and incentives
for rms to merge. For this purpose we rst compare the cooperative stability of the grand
coalition when rms are ex ante identical to the case in which, as in our setting, they are
ex ante heterogeneous, namely they are initially selling vertically di¤erentiated products as
independent rms. After showing that, in term of stability, things go quite di¤erently in
these two cases, and that, in principle, heterogeneous rms possess very strong incentives to
merge, we introduce our specic nite-horizon game of coalition formation. We show that in
equilibrium rms get engaged in partial rather than full mergers. Hence, it becomes important
to evaluate which, among the partial mergers, are more likely to arise in our setting, and which
underlying forces determine such results.
3.1 The protability and cooperative stability of the grand coalition
As initial observation, and as clearly illustrated in Table 1 above, in terms of total payo¤
the grand coalition is, not surprisingly, the most protable coalition structure obtainable in
the vertical di¤erentiated market. Thus, we may wonder whether the grand coalition is, in
general, robust against coalitional deviations. More specically, we may wonder whether, there
are feasible allocations of the monopoly prot belonging to the core of the transferable utility
game associated to our simple model. An accurate analysis shows that the answer to this
question crucially depends on the initial assumptions of the game. In particular, if the players
(rms) are assumed ex ante identical and (contrarily to our case) there is no pre-assigned level
of quality among them when the negotiation starts, the core of the corresponding cooperative
game (in partition function form), turns out to be empty. Even worse, no intermediate coalition
structures are stable even against individual deviations.
3.1.1 Empty core with ex ante identical rms
The emptiness of the core with ex ante identical rms can be easily shown as follows: it is
natural to think that three ex ante identical rms i = 1; 2; 3 would equally divide the monopoly
prot, that in our model is obtained by producing only the top quality product, thus obtaining
i =
fNg
3 =
0:03125
3 = 0:0104. In this case, at least one of the rms could decide to break the
agreement and start producing alone variant vH , thus obtaining 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H = 0:02443 if the
remaining rms jointly produce in response the intermediate quality variant (and a duopoly
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forms);32 alternatively, if the remaining rms split up into singletons and a triopoly forms, the
rm leaving the merger would obtain (fHg;fMg;fLg)H = 0:02348.
33 In both cases the deviation
is protable and the e¢ cient equally-split monopoly payo¤ is not su¢ cient to prevent that at
least one of the rms breaks the cooperative agreement to become the top-quality producer.
Analogously, all partial mergers are unstable. In fact, inside every partial merger fi; jg, for
every i; j 2 N , jointly selling either H or M against an independent rival, at least one of the
two rms could always try to break the agreement and sell, independently, either H or M .
Thus, since an ex ante identical rm i in a partial merger receives either (fi;jgfhg)fi;jg =2 = 0:0122
when the merger produces H or (fhg;fijg)fi;jg =2 = 0:00076 when it produces M , these payo¤s
are largely dominated, respectively, by (fig;fjg;fhg)H = 0:02348 and 
(fig;fjg;fhg)
M = 0:00124.
The same result would arise in a sequential bargaining protocol, since the rst rm along the
sequence would always announce its willingness to remain singleton to produce vH , the second
to remain singleton to produce vM and the third, similarly, would remain alone producing
vL. As a result, in a vertically di¤erentiated market in which rms are ex ante identical and
free to select their qualities and prices in a two-stage market game, any negotiation procedure
would presumably yields a coalition structure in which all rms remain independent. This
outcome, by the way, is what we take as starting point of our coalition formation game. Before
any merger can take place, rms are characterized by pre-assigned quality levels, due to their
previous history: say, they are either Volkswagen or Skoda. However, as in our model, once
entered a coalition, they can jointly adjust their quality-price combinations and nothing may
prevent that, say the high quality rm turns into the rm producing the lowest quality good
in a merger. However, the ex ante rmsheterogeneity is somehow crucial for the negotiation
outcome, since it provides players with ex ante di¤erent outside options.
3.1.2 Nonempty core with ex ante heterogeneous rms
If rms are assumed, as in our game, ex ante heterogeneous, since at the beginning they produce
noncooperatively three di¤erent variants, it can be easily proved that the core is nonempty.
This is because now the monopoly prot can be allocated asymmetrically according to the
initial identities (and outside options) of the players, i.e., H, M and L. Formally, we can
associate to the vertically di¤erentiated market a partition function game  = (N; v (S;C(S))),
32 Inside the monopoly at least one of the three rms is producing the top quality good. Therefore, this rm
could decide to produce it alone. The core is rather silent on the behaviour of players inside or outside the
cooperative agreement.
33Consistently with our model, we assume here that rms rst decide whther enter a coalition or not and
then set qualities and price as individual or coalitional "Nash players".
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whereN is the set of rms and v(S;C(S)) 2 R is the worth associated to every coalition of rms
S  N embedded in a given coalition structure C 2 C of which S is part. In our model, when
an alliance S  N forms, its maximal payo¤ obtains when the remaining rms stick together
in the complementary coalition fNnSg.34 Therefore, if the core of the partition function game
 exists when every S  N is embedded in C = (fSg ; fNnSg), it will a fortiori exist in any
other coalition structure containing S. Let us formally state this result.
Denition 1 The core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C)) consists of all e¢ cient
prot allocations  2 RjN j+ such that
P
k2S i  v (S;C(S)) for all S  N and for all C(S) in
which S can be embedded.
Thus, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 4 In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous
rms H, M , L and endogenous qualities and prices, the core of the corresponding partition
function game  = (N; v (S;C)) is nonempty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result simply says that in a vertical di¤erentiated market with rms initially
competing noncooperatively in prices and qualities, there would always be room for a cooper-
ative agreement between them.35 This is because, starting from their initial outside options,
there exist divisions of the monopoly payo¤ that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of
rms, which includes their departure as singletons. The grand coalition of rms would also be
the outcome of an innite-horizon sequential coalition formation game with ex ante heteroge-
neous players, where for a su¢ ciently high discount rate there would always be room for full
cooperation.36 However, as we show in the next section, if the bargaining process is sequential
and in each period the rms possess only a nite set of possibilities to propose coalitions and
divisions of the joint prot to the rivals, i.e. the game possesses a nite-horizon, the grand
34With only three rms, the behaviour outside a coalition S matters only if S = fig, i.e. when an individual
rm i is competing with the remaining rms in Nn fig, which, in turn, can either stay together, or play as
singletons. Moreover, from Section 3 we know that whenever two rms form a coalition they eliminate one of
the variant either at the quality or at the price stage. Therefore, a rm playing as singleton prefers that its
competitors merge rather than compete independently in the market: in game-theoretic terms there are positive
coalition externalities (see, for instance, Yi, 1997 and 2003).
35 In a companion paper, Gabszewicz, Marini and Tarola (2016) show that the core-existence result of this
section extends to a n-rm oligopoly if rms sell equispaced variants of the products.
36 In Bloch (1996) it is proved that if a coalition structure is core-stable it can also be sustained as a subgame
perfect equilibria of the innite-horizon sequential game of coalition formation (with a xed allocation rule).
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coalition cannot be enforced in equilibrium.37 In particular, we show that only intermediate
coalition structures (partial mergers) can be sustained as subgame perfect equilibria of the
alliance formation game. The study of which, among all feasible partial mergers, are more
likely to arise in the three-rm negotiation, it is the purpose of the next section.
3.2 The Coalition Formation Game
Our game of coalition formation occurs at the rst stage of the game. Following Bloch (1995,
1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) we model the process of coalition formation as a sequential
unanimity game in which, in an exogenous order, rms propose to their rivals an alliance to
which they also belong.38 The rm which follows in the given order among those receiving the
proposal may, in turn, either accept or reject it. In case of acceptance, the turn passes to the
subsequent rm in the proposed alliance according to the exogenous order and, if all proposed
rms accept, the alliance is irrevocably formed and its members can decide cooperatively
qualities and prices. If, alternatively, one of the rms rejects the o¤er, it becomes its turn to
make a proposal and the game continues with the same logic until a given coalition structure of
the rms is obtained. Di¤erently from Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) and following
Selten (1981) and Chatterjee et al. (1993) we let the allocation rule be part of the bargaining
process.39 Specically, when it is its turn to o¤er, a rm proposes both a merger and a division
of the merger prot among its members. The reason for this departure form their model is
that since in our coalition formation game the players (rms) are ex ante heterogeneous, no
obvious xed allocation rule can be assumed (for instance, an equal split division of joint payo¤)
before the negotiation takes place. A second distinction of our coalition formation game with
respect to Blochs (1996) and Ray and Vohras (1999) is that our game is nite-horizon, one in
which every player is allowed to make at most one proposal at each period. This means that
when a rm proposes a merger and is rejected, it can enter a coalition only when proposed
by another rm (and it accepts), remaining singleton otherwise. As explanation of this model
assumption we can simply say that mergerstime horizon is usually nite, rather than innite.
In particular, publicly traded companies commonly issue tender o¤ers to accomplish mergers
and acquisitions, thus o¤ering a given price to shareholders who, in turn, have to decide with
37 In the real world there is also be an important additional reason for which the grand coalition is unfeasible:
anti-trust authorities would always prevent a monopoly to form. This also justies the great attention we devote
to the stability of partial agreements among rms.
38To be formed, an alliance needs the unanimous agreement of all participants (hence, unanimity game). As a
result, a player can always remain independent by simply declaring the coalition only containing himself/herself.
39The same assumption is also made in Moldovanus (1992).three-player coalition formation game.
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a yes or no by a given time. Our nite-horizon-single-proposal bargaining protocol may be
intended to capture an institutionally constrained negotiation process for merging parties. In
this setting, the order of play can play a crucial role for the nal outcome. We will discuss
again below the implications of our assumptions.
In formal terms, our merger formation game is a triple G =
 
N; fi;igi2N

, with player
set N = fL;M;Hg, strategy set i and payo¤i () : ! R. For every rm (player) i 2 N , a
strategy i 2 i denes the actions ai 2 Ai available at each node (or information set Ii 2 Ii)
in which it is its turn to play. In our game, an action for a rm i 2 N can either be an element
of the set fYes, Nog coming in response to another rms proposal pj with j 6= i or, in turn, a
proposal pi = (S;) including an alliance S  N to which i belongs to and a division  2 RjSj
of the alliance joint prot S , such that
P
i2S i = S . Thus, for a rm a strategy i 2 i is a
mapping from its information sets to the set of its feasible actions Ai available therein, namely,
f(Ii) : Ii ! Ai, where Ai 

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

[ fYes,Nog

, with the property that, in every
period, a proposal pi 2

2Nn f?g ;RjSj

can be made by a rm only if, when it is its turn
to play, there are no other playersproposals on the oor and the rm itself has not already
made a proposal. That is, for every rm i 2 N the action available at every information set Iti
is ai(Iti ) = pi if both pj(I
t
j) = ? for j 6= i and pi(fIi g<t) = ? for any previous information
set, and ai(Iti ) 2 fYes,Nog otherwise. Note that every strategy prole  = (H ; M ; L) of G
induces an outcome O () = (C () ;()), namely a coalition structure C 2 C and a prole
of payo¤s  = (H ;M ;L) assigned to rms in C. The payo¤ of every rm i(p(v)) 2  is
obtained by associating to each coalition structure C a price-quality equilibrium prole p(v)
as already illustrated in Section 2. As last step, we need an equilibrium concept for the game
occurring at the rst stage, namely a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the coalition
formation game and, accordingly, a notion of stable coalition structure.
Denition 2 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) of the coaliton formation game is a
strategy prole  such that, for every rm i 2 N , every proper subgame G0  G, and every
i 2 i, i
 
i ; 

 i
  k  i;  i.
Denition 3 A coalition structure C 2 C (a partition of the N rms) is stable if and only if
it is sustained by a SPE of the coalition formation game, namely, C = C().
Once again, it is important to mention that the outcome of the game would be completely
di¤erent if the rms were ex ante identical, i.e. they would not possess any pre-assigned quality
level. In this case no merger would arise and all rms would remain independent producing
27
three vertically di¤erentiated goods, as at the starting point of our coalition formation game.
So, we might imagine our three heterogeneous rms as the result of a (failed) negotiation
process previously occurred among three ex ante identical rms. 40
3.3 Stable Mergers
In this section we characterize all equilibria of the sequential game of coalition formation. Since
this game is sensitive to the identity of the initial player, we consider, in turn, the outcomes
obtained by the game when either rm H,M and L are the initiators of the bargaining process.
Let us rst consider the case in which the rm producing the top-quality good (rm H ) is the
initiator of the coalition formation game.
It can be proved the following:
Proposition 5 When rm H is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H continues to produce variant vH
and the two remaining rms M and L only market variant vM .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The main mechanism driving this result is that when in the negotiation every player has
only one turn of proposal, or in general the negotiation occurs in a nite horizon, the last player
can potentially exploit its "last mover advantage", by inducing the other players to accept their
outside options. For this reason the game initiator (here rm H) has an incentive to avoid
to be exploited inside a coalition and, anticipating this, will prefer to play as singleton, also
knowing in advance that the remaining rms will always prefer to merge to play in a duopoly
than being independent and competing in a triopoly. Therefore, the result of Proposition 5
strongly hinges on the identity of the initiator of the game, here rm H.
Applying the same rationale as above, in the next proposition, we can easily show that,
when rmM is the initial player, CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) is the only stable coalition structure.
40Another possibility would be to assume two ex ante identical rms initially competing with one rm selling
a di¤erent quality. In this case the two identical rms would presumably prune one of their duplicate variant,
thus ending in a duopoly with two heterogeneous rms. In this case the game of caolition formation would
result of no much interest. We thank one referee for raising this possibility.
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Proposition 6 When rm M is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg), where rm H and L jointly produce variant
vH and rm M produces variant vM .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice how, in both Proposition 5 and 6, the initiator of the game is never part of a merger
in equilibrium. Indeed, as shown in detail in the proofs of both propositions (see the Appendix)
the payo¤of a rm when remaining singleton (and rationally expecting that the other rms will
merge) dominates that of being part of the grand coalition, since in this case the distribution of
prots will be unfavourable for the initial proposer. The equilibrium prot accruing to either
rm H or M when initiating the game and competing against a merger is, therefore, larger
than when they are part of the merger itself. The optimal strategy is, therefore, to induce the
remaining rms to merge. About the role played by the (exogenous) order of play (here H,
M , L except when a player rejects a proposal becoming the new games initiator) it should
be observed that this does not play a crucial role in shaping the stable mergers but rather the
rmsnal equilibrium payo¤s. For instance, in Proposition 6, if it was L to play after M , the
main di¤erence would be that rm H could exploit in full its last mover advantage, granting
its mergers ally (rm L) a lower payo¤.
Another relevant force underlying the outcomes of the coalition formation game is the in-
herent di¢ culty of rms H and M to engage in a merger together. This explains the di¤erent
type of merger occurring when rm L (the bottom quality one) is the initiator of the negoti-
ation. In facts, in this case, rm L cannot credibly commit to remain independent when the
remaining rms (H and M) prefer to play as singletons rather than merge (see Table 1). The
reason is that the merger between rm H and M is problematic just because in this circum-
stanceM optimally leapfrogs the rms selling the bottom quality rm in the merger, and ends
up sharing the top quality rm duopoly payo¤, which is lower than the sum of their prots
under triopoly (cf. section 2). Knowing in advance the infeasibility of coalition fH;Mg, rm
L strategically prefers to let rm H playing independently, and form an alliance with rm M .
This is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 When rm L is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H produces variant vH and M and
L jointly produce variant vM .
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Proof. See the Appendix.
It is worth noting that if the game initiator would be selected at random, the most
likely outcome of the merger formation game would be that in which the coalition struc-
ture CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) forms, the other possible outcome implying the formation of
CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg). Moreover, although at equilibrium the same coalition structure
CH;ML forms both when either rm H or L starts the negotiation, there is a di¤erence in term
of rent extraction, in the two cases, for merged rmsM and L: when rm H is the one starting
the negotiation, rmM in merger fM;Lg only receives its outside option M = M = 0:00124,
whereas rm L is able to get a prot (fHg;fM;Lg)L = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fM;Lg   M = 0:00027 > L, ex-
ploiting its last-mover advantage in the sequential game. When, on the other hand, it is the
rm L to start the game, rm M in alliance fM;Lg receives (fHg;fM;Lg)M   L = 0:00147 >
M = 0:00124, while rm L only receives its noncooperative payo¤ 

L = 0:00005. In both
cases, rm H receives its duopoly payo¤ H = 0:02443.
Quite surprisingly, in the merger formation game rm M enjoys a rst-mover advantage,
just because, when it starts the negotiation, it is able to enforce CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg)
extracting a prot of (fH;Lg;fMg)M = 0:00152 higher than in all other cases. Moreover, this
comes at expense of rmH, which in coalition structure CHL;M only receives its noncooperative
payo¤ H = 0:02348.
Finally, it can be noticed that, since for any order of play our one-shot coalition formation
game always sustains only one equilibrium alliance structure, the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the nite repeated version of the game will generate the same outcome period after period.
We condense this conclusion in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 If the coalition formation game is repeated for a nite number of periods, the
coalition structures which are stable in the one-shot game will continue to be so in the nite-
horizon repeated version of the game, sustained by the same SPE strategy prole repeated at
every period.
Therefore, even in a repeated nite-horizon framework, the stability of CH;ML and CHL;M
would continue to hold.
The results of our coalition formation game, conrms that the most likely mergers occur
between intermediate and bottom-quality producers, with the premium quality brands prefer-
ably running alone. This is the case of some top car producers as, for instance, Daimler-Benz,
whose only participation is in the production of Smart, initially started as a joint venture with
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Nicolas Hayek, the inventor and producer of Swatch. What our model stylized results also
indicate, is that mergers betwenn intermediate and bottom quality rms, as those occurred
between Volkswagen and Skoda, or between Fiat and Chrysler in the automotive industry,
should be the norm. In these cases the intermediate quality product is withdrawn from the
market, which can be interpreted saying that of all products sold by the merger have a ten-
dency to converge towards the same level of quality of their premium brand products. The
model also underlines how the mergers between top and bottom quality rms are also likely,
as for instance those occurring between generics pharmaceutical manufacturers and premium
brand pharmaceutical companies. Our model results just suggests that in this case low quality
products can be protably retired from the market, in order to soften the competition among
the remaining goods.
4 A brief discussion of our main assumptions
There are some assumptions of the model which deserve to be discussed, also in view of its
possible extensions. We have assumed that only three players populate the market. While
this assumption represents a natural entry point, one may wonder whether our main ndings
can be extended to the case of a market populated by N rms, with N > 3: In the case of
N rms, partial collusion can take place among a group of rms selling variant located at the
bottom of the quality ladder, in the middle or at the top. In the rst case (resp. the last
case), a bottom cartel (resp. a top cartel) competes against a fringe of rms, each of which
sells a higher (resp. lower) quality variant than the ones produced by the cartel. In the case of
an intermediate cartel involving rms whose qualities lie in the middle of the quality ladder,
it competes against lower and higher quality rivals. Whatever the type of cartel, two drivers
a¤ect the choice to keep all variants on sale vs. withdrawing some of them. The former choice
(all variants on sale) is driven by the protability of being where the demand is, namely to
meet di¤erent types of consumers through a wide set of price/quality mix (demand driver).
Keeping on sale all variants however determines a cannibalization e¤ect inside the coalition
since the variants produced by the colluding rms are perceived by consumers as mutually
exclusive alternatives (cannibalization driver). Finally, it is worth remarking that the quality
gap between variants (both when they are produced by colluding rms and when they are
produced by competing rms) directly a¤ects the prices and the corresponding market share
of these variants at equilibrium. In a companion paper (Gabszewicz, Marini, Tarola, 2017)
we analyze how these drivers interact in a market populated by N vertically di¤erentiated
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rms where some of them decide to collude in prices. There, we adopt a short-run perspective
thus restricting the analysis to exogenously given qualities. In that setting, we observe that
whatever the type of coalition (bottom, top or intermediate cartel), the colluding rms always
x prices in such a way that some variants stop having a positive demand at equilibrium.
Accordingly, we conclude that the driver inducing product pruning is stronger than the one
inducing product proliferation.41 This paper in a way conrms and reinforces that nding since
we prove that, even if a variant is not withdrawn at the price stage, it is removed from the
market at the quality stage.
The above statement immediately opens the door to a discussion of another key assumption
in our model. We assume that initially each player is a single-product rm. In line with this,
in the post-merger scenario, a priori at most three variants could be observed at equilibrium:
two of them would be produced by the merged entity, while the third would be marketed by the
competitor. Nonetheless, in our analysis we allow for pruning and, accordingly, at equilibrium
we obtain that only two variants are sold and the merged entity always withdraws from the
market one of the two available variants.
It is worth noting that, as clearly illustrated by Norman et al. (2005), allowing for pruning
turns out to be very meaningful when products are vertically rather than horizontally di¤eren-
tiated. Indeed, they argue that while undi¤erentiated or horizontally di¤erentiated products
induce rms "to maintain their pre-merger product lines as a means to reach as many con-
sumers as possible" (Norman et al., p.1205, 2005), the same argument no longer holds when
products are di¤erentiated along a quality dimension. In this latter case, "the removal of in-
termediate quality goods can soften competition between goods remaining in the post-merger
market" (Norman et al., p.1206, 2005).
From a theoretical viewpoint the solution to the dilemma between single-product vs. multi-
products is mainly depending on the income dispersion and the specication of the cost func-
tion. In the seminal papers by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) and Gabszewicz et al. (1986),
it is shown that, in the case in which a rm acts as a monopolist, o¤ering a single variant can
be optimal, in absence of costs, if the income dispersion is su¢ ciently narrow. So, taking the
parameter  as a lower bound of the market, a necessary condition for the single-product to
emerge at equilibrium is that  > 0. Otherwise, namely when  = 0, then the specication of
the cost function determines the optimal choice of variants.
Interestingly, income dispersion and costs have been identied as major drivers of the
41See Johnson and Myatt (2003) on product pruning.
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production choice even later and in a di¤erent setting of vertical di¤erentiation. Acharyya
(1998), for example, proves that without any ex-ante restriction on market coverage, the choice
of being single-product can depend on the specication of the cost function. In his analysis,
a rm optimally o¤ers a single variant whenever the cost of quality does not increase too
fast. Even more relevant, a further driver can a¤ect the solution to this dilemma, namely the
distribution of consumers in the market. On this point, when there exists only two di¤erent
types of consumers and each type is parametrized by a parameter capturing his preferences
(or tastes), it may well happen that, regardless of the cost, the monopolist decides to serve
only a part of the market and to drive the low-type consumers out of the market. In Acharyya
(2005), however, the constraining e¤ect of income can induce the monopolist to discriminate
among consumers. In particular, Acharyya (2005) shows that while di¤erences in preferences
do not prevent the monopolist to optimally sells a single variant, under income disparity, a
proliferation strategy (quality discrimination) is observed at equilibrium. Moreover, quality
discriminating can be observed both when the low-income consumers are income-constrained
and in the alternative case when also the high-income consumers are income constrained.
Still, in this latter case, the protability to discriminate among consumers is related to the
tastes di¤erences compared with income di¤erences so that discrimination can also induce
the monopolist to underprovide quality to the high-income consumers. When moving from a
monopoly to a imperfectly competitive market, even under an income constraint, it is shown
that a rm refrains from selling more then a single variant. For example, in Bonisseau and
Lahmandi-Ayed (2006), the incentive to product proliferation for a incumbent is considered
when an entrant contemplates to enter a vertically di¤erentiated market and consumers are
uniformly distributed but income-constrained. In their analysis, adopting a multi-product
strategy to face entry is never protable since the lower quality variant which the incumbent
could sell, under multi-product strategy, would not contribute to increase its equilibrium prot.
Accordingly, they conclude, in line with Shaked and Sutton (1982 1983) and Gabszewicz et al.
(1986) that income dispersion rather than threat of entry could be a signicant force driving
rms to adopt a multiproduct strategy.
Although cannibalization represents in our model one of the major factors a¤ecting product
pruning in the ex-post merger scenario, one may wonder whether this driver could still hold
in an alternative specication where the lowest willingness to pay is strictly positive. In this
case, it can be shown that when the intermediate and bottom quality rm merge, the low
quality variant is withdrawn from the market at the quality stage rather than at the price
stage. So, when consumers are income-constrained, it is no longer protable for rms to use
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a price strategy to drop a variant from the market and thus, if quality would be exogenously
given, it would be possible to observe a multi-product strategy by the merging rms.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the endogenous formation of mergers in vertically di¤erentiated markets
in which full or partial binding agreements among initially heterogenous rms can be signed
over prices and qualities of the products. We have shown that regardless of the protability of
the full collusive agreement (i.e. the one signed by all rms in the market), such an arrangement
is not obtained in a (nite horizon) sequential negotiation process requiring the unanimity
of rms. Conversely, we found that the sequential bargaining process enforces only partial
collusive agreements, namely those involving subsets of rms. In particular, stable associations
of rms always include the rm producing the bottom quality variant, which is, however,
never sold by the coalition at equilibrium. Further, whatever the coalition structure arising
at the equilibrium, the market moves from a triopoly to a duopoly with only two variants on
sale. The rationale underlying this result can be found in the nature of competition among
vertically di¤erentiated rms. Indeed, in a partial merger, the optimal set of products to market
is dened by balancing the cannibalization e¤ect within the coalition and the stealing e¤ect
occurring between the coalition and the rm outside. When the bottom quality is kept for
sale in the market under a collusive agreement, the former e¤ect always dominates the latter.
As immediate consequence, this variant is withdrawn from the market and the equilibrium
conguration coincides with that observed in the case of a duopoly in terms of price and
quality gap between variants. In a complementary perspective, we can state that moving from
a triopoly (observed in the noncooperative scenario) to a duopoly under partial collusion, rms
can soften price competition in the market and magnify the quality di¤erentiation between
the variants kept on sale. This view is in line with the empirical ndings, where mergers
emphasize "product di¤erentiation" among merging rms and also with respect to the rivals.
Partial mergers are, thus, as a means to enhance dynamic competition for the market, while
decreasing static competition in the market.
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6 Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. In order to escape from the cannibalization taking place between adjacent vari-
ants, merging top and intermediate quality rms enhance maximal di¤erentiation between their
products by putting one of their variants at the bottom of the quality ladder. As a result, the
rival L "leapfrogs" this variant thereby selling a product which lies now in the middle of the
quality ladder.
Proof. At the quality stage, rmsprots are:

(fH;Mg;fLg)
H =
1
4
(4vHvM   vHvL   3vLvM )
(4vM   vL)  
1
2
v2H

(fH;Mg;fLg)
M =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2M

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L =
vLvM (vM   vL)
(4vM   vL)2
  1
2
v2L
It is easy to see that, the joint prot of mergerfH;Mg is monotonically decreasing in vM , as
@


(fH;Mg;fLg)
H +
(fH;Mg;fLg)
M

@vM
=
(4v3LvM+v
3
L 48v2Lv2M+20v2LvM+192vLv3M 256v4M)
4(vL 4vM )3 < 0:
Thus, the merging rms nd it protable to set the quality of one of their variants at the
minimum admissible value, say 0: By doing this, they choose to produce a variant which is at
the bottom of the quality ladder. If the competitor L would keep its own variant at the same
quality level, then it would obtain nil prots. Rather, choosing to produce an intermediate
variant vM > 0 would yield positive equilibrium prots equal to

(fH;Mg;fLg)
L =
v2M (vH   vL) (vM   vL) (vH   vM ) 
v2M + vHvL   4vHvM + 2vMvL
2 > 0:
As this prot is strictly positive for any vH > vM > vL = 0, one can conclude that rm L
will nd protable to leapfrog the post-merger bottom quality variant put on o¤er by coalition
fH;Mg, namely vL = 0, by producing an intermediate quality variant (denoted above vM ).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4. In the three-rm vertically di¤erentiated market with ex ante heterogeneous
rms and endogenous qualities and prices, the core of the partition function game  = (N; v (S;C))
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is nonempty
Proof. Core allocations are individually-rational and group-rational prot division  =
(H ;M ;L) of the e¢ cient monopoly payo¤ v(N) = fNg = 0:03125. Thus, the set of  2
Core() must respect the following inequalities:
P
i=H;M;L
i = v(N) = 
fNg = 0:03125;
H +M  v (fH;Mg ; (fH;Mg ; fLg)) = (fH;Mg;fLg)fH;Mg = 0:02443
H +L  v (fH;Lg ; (fH;Lg ; fMg)) = (fH;LgfMg)fH;Mg = 0:02443
M +L  v (fM;Lg ; (fHg ; fM;Lg)) = ((H);fM;Lg)fH;Mg = 0:00152
H  v (fHg ; (fHg ; fM;Lg)) = ((H);fM;Lg)H = 0:02443
M  v (fMg ; (fH;Lg ; fMg)) = (fH;LgfMg)M = 0:00152
L  v (fLg ; (fH;Mg ; fLg)) = (fH;Mg;fLg)L = 0:00152
which surely hold, since:
0:02443 + 0:00152 + 0:00152 = 0:02749 < 0:03125:
Note that for every i-th rm, v (fig ; (fig ; fNn figg)) > v (fig ; (fig ; fjg ; fhg)) for every j; h 2
Nn fig, implying that each rm gains more when the remaining rms form a coalition than
when playing alone. Thus, the last numerical inequality holds a fortiori when, after one rm
leaves the grand coalition, the remaining rms split-up in singletons. As a result, all e¢ cient
payo¤allocations  = (H ;M ;L) rewarding every rm at least its maximal deviating payo¤
and distributing the remaining surplus Z between the three rms, namely,
Z = fNg  ((H);fM;Lg)H  (fH;LgfMg)M  (fH;Mg;fLg)L = 0:0085
belong to the core, which is, therefore, nonempty.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. When rm H is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), where rm H continues to produce variant vH
and the two remaining rms M and L only market variant vM .
Proof. The game can be solved backward. Firms H available actions at the initial node
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(information set I1H 2 IH) are the following (proposals):
AH(I
1
H) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fHg)] :
Assume rst that rm H proposes the grand coalition fNg associated to a given division
 2 fNg of the e¢ cient monopoly prot between the three rms. By the order of the game,
rm M can either accept or reject. If it rejects the o¤er, it is its turn to make a proposal and
can propose one of the following:
AM (I
1
M ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fMg)] :
We know (from Table 1) that, for any associated payo¤ division, the coalition structure
CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg) is dominated by the choice of rm H and M to play as singletons,
since

(fH;Mg;fLg)
fH;Mg < 

H +

M :
Therefore, when made by rm M , the proposal pHMM = (fH;Mg ;) will always be rejected
by rm H. In this event, rm H has no more proposals to make. Thus, rm L can gain
its highest payo¤ by proposing fNg, o¤ering the noncooperative prots to H and M and get
the di¤erence fNg   H   M , which is its most protable outcome. To break the ties, we
can initially assume that, when gaining equal payo¤s all rms prefer being in a coalition than
remaining singletons (although the reasoning can be repeated when the alternative case holds).
A similar outcome would be reached if, after a rejection, rm M proposes pMLM = (fM;Lg ;)
or pNM = (fNg ;) which, in turn, would be both refused by rm L, aiming to propose (as
last proposer) the grand coalition, obtaining L = fNg  H  M . Analogously, if rm M
accepts to enter the grand coalition when proposed by rm H, it knows that, when it is its
turn to play, rm L will always reject such proposal to propose, in turn, the grand coalition
with a payo¤ allocation which assigns to its rivals their Nash equilibrium payo¤s. Reasoning
backward, rm H knows that, if it proposes the grand coalition, it would obtain at most its
Nash equilibrium payo¤. For this reason, rm H can try to make alternative o¤ers. Proposing
pHMH = (fH;Mg ;) is out of question, since player M would always reject it, and the game
would return to the situation described above. Another chance for rm H is to propose
pHLH = (fH;Lg ;) that, in turn, would be rejected by rm L with the aim to propose again
(fH;Lg ;), o¤ering to rm H its noncooperative outside option. Alternative proposals by
rm L (after its rejection of fH;Lg proposed by rm H) involving rm M , as pNL = ffNg ;g
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or pMLL = ffM;Lg ;g would similarly be rejected by rm M to enforce, as last proposer, the
grand coalition payo¤. Thus, at the initial node the most protable action for rm H is to
propose pHH = fHg, signalling the intention to play irrevocably as singleton. By doing this, it
is aware that rm M can either propose pMLM = (fM;Lg ;) or pM = (fMg). In the rst case,
rm M knows that rm L will reject to propose, in turn, pMLL = (fM;Lg ;), o¤ering M to
rm M and keeping the di¤erence, since: (fHgfM;Lg)fMLg  M > L. In the second case, namely
when rm M proposes pMM = fMg, a triopoly arises and rm M obtains M . Since with equal
payo¤s rms prefer by assumption to be in a coalition rather than remaining as singletons,
in this subgame the choice of rm M will be pMLM = (fM;Lg ;). Therefore, the coalition
structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) is stable because can be sustained by the following SPE
strategy prole along the equilibrium path:42
 =

H = fHg ; M =

fM;Lg ;0

; L =

No, fM;Lg ;00

;
where 0 = (0M ;
0
L), for 
0
M = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
fMLg   L;L, 0L = L; and 
00
=


00
M ;
00
L

,
for 
00
M = 

M and 
00
L = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
ML   M . If we assume, to break ties, that with equal
payo¤s rms prefer to be singletons rather than being in coalition, the same coalition structure
CH;ML can be enforced by a SPE of the coalition formation game with the di¤erence that,
along the equilibrium path, 0M = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
fMLg   (L + ), 0L = L +  and 
00
M = 

M + ,

00
L = 
(fHgfM;Lg)
fMLg   (M + ), for  > 0. The same occurs in all other proposals implying the
presence of a coalition. The reason is that to convince a rm to join an alliance it must receive
something more (an  > 0) than its noncooperative payo¤. Therefore, coalition structure
CH;ML remains stable (namely supported by a SPE strategy prole of the sequential coalition
formation game) for every adopted rule to break ties. Finally, to see that CH;ML is the
only stable coalition structure arising when rm H is the initiator of the game, note that
any alternative strategy prole cannot be SPE just because rm H possesses an incentive
to protably deviate by proposing pH = fHg with the expectation to compete in a duopoly
(namely under CH;ML) and gaining a payo¤
((H);(ML))
H = 0:02443 which dominates its triopoly
prot H = 0:02348 (or in turn, 

H + ).
42We have verbally described all out of equilibrium path actions which compose the SPE strategy prole 
and, therefore, for ease of simplicity, we do not repeat it here.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6. When rm M is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg).
Proof. As above, the game can be solved backward. Firms M available actions at the
initial node (information set I1M 2 IM ) are:
AM (I
1
M ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fMg)] :
Again, if rmM proposes the grand coalition fNg, with an associated division of the monopoly
prot  2 fNg, the next player, rm H, would reject the o¤er to propose, in turn, one of the
following:
AH(I
1
1 ) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Mg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fHg)] :
Coalition structure CHM;L = (fH;Mg ; fLg) is dominated by the choice of rm H and M to
play as singletons and proposal pHMH = (fH;Mg ;) is, therefore, rejected by rm M . If this
occurs, rm M has no more proposals and, hence, rm L can propose fNg, obtaining L =
fNg   H   M , which is its most protable outcome. Similar outcome would be reached
if, after a rejection, rm H o¤ers, in turn, pHLH = (fH;Lg ;) or pNH = (fNg ;), which can
either be accepted or refused by rm M , but nevertheless the nal payo¤ would, for rm H
and M , be their noncooperative outside options. Thus, reasoning backward, rm M knows
that by proposing the grand coalition it would receive at most its noncooperative payo¤. Its
alternative proposals are pHMM = (fH;Mg ;) which would be rejected by rm H (so the
game would reach the same outcome described above) or pMLM = ffM;Lg ;g which, in turn,
would be rejected by rm L with the aim to propose pL = ffM;Lg ;g, o¤ering rm M its
noncooperative outside option, which turns out to be better than any other coalition containing
rm H that would, in fact, exploit its last mover advantage. Note that forming alliance fM;Lg
would, for rm L, be better than any other proposal involving rm H, that could exploit its
last-mover advantage. Thus, at the initial node, the most protable action for rm M is to
propose pMM = fMg, with the knowledge that rm H prefers to be in coalition than playing
as singleton proposing pHLH = ffH;Lg ;g rather than pHH = fHg. Hence, the proposal pHLH
by rm H would be rejected by rm L, that can counter-o¤er, in turn, pHLL = ffH;Lg ;g,
giving H to rm H and keeping the di¤erence for itself, since 
(fH;LgfMg)
HL   H > L. As
a result, the coalition structure CHL;M = (fH;Lg ; fMg) is stable since it can be sustained by
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the following SPE strategy prole along the equilibrium path:43
 =

H =

fH;Lg ;0

; M = fMg ; L =

No, fH;Lg ;00

;
with 0 = (0H ;
0
L), where 
0
H = 
(fH;LgfMg)
fHLg  L and 0L = L and 
00
=


00
M ;
00
L

, where

00
H = 

H and 
00
L = 
(fH;LgfMg)
fHLg   H . As in the proof of Proposition 6, if, under equal
payo¤s, rms prefer to be singletons than being in a coalition, the coalition structure CHL;M
can be enforced as a SPE of the coalition formation game for, 0H = 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
fHLg   (L + ),
0L = 

L+ , 
00
H = 

H +  and 
00
L = 
(fH;Lg;fMg)
fHLg   (H + ), for  > 0; and, similarly for all
other proposal involving coalitions outside the equilibrium path. Finally, CHL;M is the only
stable coalition structure when rm M is the initiator of the coalition formation game just
because in any alternative strategy prole rm M would always prefer to propose pMM = fMg
and compete in a duopoly with a payo¤(fH;LgfMg)M = 0:00152 rather than getting its triopoly
prot M = 0:00124 (or in turn, 

M + ), which occurs in all other subgames.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7. When rm L is the initiator of the coalition formation game, the only stable
coalition structure is CML;H = (fHg ; fM;Lg).
Proof. Again in this proof we reason backward. Note that when rm L is the initiator
of the game, the line of reasoning is slightly di¤erent than in Proposition 6 and 7. Firms L
available actions at the initial node (information set I1L 2 IL) are:
AL(I
1
L) = [(fNg ;) ; (fH;Lg ;) ; (fM;Lg ;) ; (fLg)] :
To break ties assume initially that, with equal payo¤s, rms prefer to be in coalition rather
than act as singletons. Note rst that if rm L proposes pLL = fLg, the turn passes to
player H, who can either propose pHH = fHg, in which case the game ends with CH;M;L =
(fHg ; fMg ; fLg) or instead pHMH = (fH;Mg ;), which again forces the game to end with
CH;M;L = (fHg ; fMg ; fLg), since CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg) is dominated by CH;M;L for both
rmH andM (see Table 1). So di¤erently from above, rm L is unable to enforce the formation
of its complementary coalition Nn fLg = fH;Mg by signalling its willingness to play alone
as singleton. Alternatively, if rm L proposes either pNL = (fNg ;) or pHLL = (fH;Lg ;)
it always induces the formation of coalition structure CH;ML with H = 
(fHg;fM;Lg)
H , M =
43Again, for simplicity, we skip the description of all playersout of equilibrium actions.
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
(fHg;fM;Lg)
M  L and L = L. The reason is that, by the order of play, after both proposals
the turn passes to rm H whose optimal strategy is to reject the o¤er and to announce pHH =
fHg, thus inducing proposal pMLM = (fM;Lg ; ()) by rm M with M = (fHg;fM;Lg)M   L
and L = L, which rm L will accept. Finally, if rm L proposes at the beginning of the
game pMLL = (fM;Lg ;), for any prot distribution  rmM will reject it to propose, in turn,
pMLM = (fM;Lg ;), again o¤ering L = L to rm L that, in turn, will accept. Therefore,
since by assumption with equal payo¤s rms prefer to be in coalition, the game possesses as
unique outcome the intermediate coalition structure CH;ML = (fHg ; fM;Lg), which can be
sustained as a SPE strategy proles. Again, it can be easily checked that the game outcome
does not change if, to break ties, we assume that under equal payo¤s rms prefer to play as
singletons rather than being in coalitions.
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